Webinar Institutional and Organizational Economics

le 17 novembre 2022
The Grenoble Economic Research Center (CREG), the Grenoble Applied Economics Lab (GAEL), and the Research Institute for the Political Economy of the Firm (IREPE) in partnership with the Grenoble Doctoral School of Economics (EDSE) invite you to the fifth
From Coase to Culture: Visible Hands Building Equilibrium?
MIT Sloan School of Management

Abstract: if contracts were perfect then there would be no need for bosses (Coase, 1937), so a key task for visible hands is to do what formal contracts cannot—such as "build an equilibrium." But if this task were easy then one would not expect the persistent performance differences have become a striking feature of many empirical analyses. There are many models where parties use "relational contracts" to improve their performance, and some of these models produce persistent performance differences, but the parties are in equilibrium from the beginning. Organizational economics needs models of building an equilibrium.


Mis à jour le 25 octobre 2022